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STATUTORY REDEALPTION RIGHTS
Herein will be discussed some of the problems which arise under
the provisions of the code of Washington granting the right to
redeem from execution sales of real property
These rights do not come into existence until the moment such
a sale has been made,' and are exclusively statutory creations,2
so that all the particulars of these rights must be ascertained and
determined from the terms of the code provisions relating thereto.
These statutes are benevolent 3 and remedia 4 in character, having
as their main object the prevention of the oppression of a debtor
and the sacrifice of his property 5 They are, therefore, highly
favored" and in generally liberally construed, 7 m order that the
property of a debtor may pay as many of his liabilities as possible."
But they should not be so construed as to enlarge or extend their
terms by implication beyond what the legislature has authorized
or intendedY Thus, the statutes are strictly construed to determine
the tune for redemption, 0 the conditions imposed, 1 and the classes
which come within their provisions ;12 but a liberal construction is
"Dane v. Daniel, 23 Wash. 379, 63 Pac. 268 (1900) Hardy v. Hermott,
11 Wash. 460, 39 Pac. 958 (1895).2 Schmidt v. Worley, 134 Wash. 582, 236 Pac. 111 (1925) Dane v.
Daniel, Note 1, Hays v. Merchants' Bank, 14 Wash. 192, 44 Pac. 137 (1896)
Knipe v. Austin, 13 Wash. 189, 43 Pac. 25, 44 Pac. 531 (1895) Hardy v.
Herrott, Note 1, Scott v. Patterson, 1 Wash. 487, 20 Pac. 593 (1889).
Scott v. Patterson, Note 2.
'Muller v. Harrison, 46 S. D. 295, 192 N. W 750 (1923).
Scott v. Patterson, Note 2.
'Union Esperanza M. Co. v. Shandon M. Co., 18 N. M. 153, 135 Pao. 78
(1913).
'Scott v. Patterson, Note 2; Whitehead v. Hall, 148 Ill. 253, 35 N. E.
871 (1893) Northern Central R. Go. v. Hering, 93 Md. 164, 48 Atl. 461
(1901) Lightbody vi. Sammers, 98 Minn. 203, 108 N. W 846 (1906) and
cases in Note 8.
Kofoed v. Gordon, 122 Cal. 314, 54 Pac. 1115 (1898) Stevenson v.
Seblrng, 63 Colo. 4, 164 Pac. 308 (1917) Schuck v. Gerlach, 101 Ill. 338
(1882) Hervey v. Krost, 116 Ind. 268, 19 N. E. 125 (1888) King V. Ben-
der, 116 Fed. 813 (C. C. A., 9th, 1902) Rambeck v. LaBree, 156 Minn. 310,
194 N. W 643 (1923).
SUnion ,speranza M. Co. v. Shandon M. Co., Note 6, Thorrnley v.
Moore, 106 Ill. 496 (1883) Duiley v. Davis, 69 Il1. 133 (1873) Little v.
People, 43 Ill. 188 (1867).
10 Union Esperanza M. Co. v. Shandon M. Co., Note 6, Fort Wayne Build,
ers S. Co. v. Pfeiffer, 60 Ind. App. 615, 111 N. E. 192 (1916)
nUnion Esperanza M. Co. v. Shandon, Note 6.
1Aiken v. Brdgeford, 84 Ala. 295, 4 So. 266 (1888) Dickenson v.
Duckworth, 74 Ark. 138, 85 S. W 82 (1905) Pollard 'v. Harlow, 138 Cal.
390, 71 Pac. 648 (1903) Bennett v. Wilson, 122 Cal. 509, 55 Pac. 390, 68
A. S. R. 61 (1898) Suttles v. Sewell, 105 Ga. 129, 31 S. E. 41 (1898)
Beadle v. Cole, 173 Ill. 136, 50 N. E. 809 (1898) Hervey V. Krost, Note 8;
Ft. Wayne Builders S. Co. 'v. Pfeiffer Note 10; Cooper v. Maurer, 122 Ia.
321, 98 N. W 124 (1904).
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given the statutes to make them effective as to those who are
granted the right,13 and in favor of the right in cases of doubt or
ambiguity .
Under the code of Washington every sale of an estate or interest
in real property pursuant to an "execution, decree or order of
sale" is made subject to redemption, with the single exception
that such a sale of a leasehold of less than two years unexpired
term is absolute, that is without redemption.' It is also the law
in this jurisdiction, settled by judicial decisions, that a sale of real
property subject to redemption, whether made by virtue of a
judgment at law or a decree in equity, does not divest the owner
of his legal title or transfer it to the purchaser at the sale. Dur
ing the entire period of redemption and until execution and de-
livery of sheriff's deed, the legal title remains in the owner. The
sale merely operates to suspend, and not to remove, the lien of the
judgment or decree under which the sale was made and all sub-
sequent liens.'6
The statute gives the judgment debtor, or his successor in inter
est, the right to redeem." A judgment debtor is "a person against
whom a judgment for, or directing the payment of, a sum of money
may be enforced."' 8 A person does not become a "judgment"
debtor by execution and delivery of his note and mortgage secur-
ing an indebtedness, on obtaining merchandise on credit, or a loan
of money, or by the commission of a tort for which he is liable in
damages. It is only when and not until a judgment has been
rendered against him for a sum in money found due on account
of any such or other liability, that he becomes, or acqires the
status of, a judgment debtor. It is unquestionable, therefore, that
the "judgment debtor" referred to in the redemption statute
under consideration is that person, natural or artificial, who is
adjudged to owe and must pay the sum found due in the judgment
or decree pursuant to which an execution sale is made.
Since the statute expressly gives the judgment debtor the right
to redeem, he is generally held to have that right notwithstanding
"Ft. Wayne Builders S. Co. v. Pfeiffer Note 10.
I "Danenhauer v. Dawson, 65 Ark. 129, 46 S. W 131, 44 L. R. A. 193
(1898) Bruschke v. Wright, 166 Ill. 188, 46 N. E. 813, 57 A. S. R. 125(1897).
"1 Sess. L. 1899, p. 87, Sec. 5, Sec. 584 Rem. Comp. Stat.
"Ford v. Nokomis State Bank, 135 Wash. 37, 237 Pac. 314 (1925),
(judgment at law) Cochran v. Cochran, 114 Wash. 499, 195 Pac. 224
(1921) (decree in equity- Singly v. Warren, 18 Wash. 434, 51 Pac. 1066, 63
(1921) (decree in equity) Singly v. Warren, 18 Wash. 434, 51 Pac. 1066, 63
A. S. R. 896 (1898) Knowles v. Rogers, 27 Wash. 211, 67 Pac. 572 (1902).
" Sec. 594, Rem. Comp. Stat.
" Webster's New International Dict.
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he never had any, or has parted with all, interest in the land.19 As
said in one case .20
"The statute provides that the judgment debtor, as
such, may redeem, not that he may redeem only, and in
the event, that he has no successor in interest in the prop-
erty sold under execution. There is no good reason why
the statute, which is remedial in its character, should
receive a narrow construction, in order to defeat the right
of redemption which it intended to give. It nght be that
the judgment debtor has covenanted with his successor in
interest to effect a redemption from the sale, and a vari-
ety of other cases nght readily be imagined in which the
judgment debtor, even though he had sold the property,
could still have an interest in effecting a redemption from
the execution sale."
And in another -21
"The right of the judgment debtor whose title has been
sold on execution to redeem from the sale does not depend
upon the condition of his title at the time of the sale or
redemption. The language of the statute is direct and un-
ambiguous. The right is given to the person against whom
the execution issued, and whose title was sold thereon. It
follows the person and not the land, and continues for the
period allowed by law, although the debtor meanwhile
may have parted with his title. The right secured by the
judgment debtor to redeem, although he has conveyed the
land, is often an important and valuable one. Where he
has conveyed with warranty, he is enabled thereby to pro-
tect the title of his grantee, and secure himself against
liability, and if he has received a full consideration for the
land, it is just and equitable that he should discharge it
by redemption, from the lien acquired by the purchaser on
the sale, although he may not have bound himself by any
covenant to do so. Nor is there any incongruity in hold-
mg that the right of redemption eo-exists in the judgment
debtor and his grantee. Where the former has con-
veyed the land his redemption will mure to the benefit of
the holder of the legal title, and the owner has the means
of protecting his own interest, if the judgment debtor is
either unable or unwilling to make the redemption."
The successor in interest of the judgment debtor may redeem.
Who is successor in interest 9 The statute formerly in force in
IgHenderson v,. Prestwood, 114 Ala. 464, 22 So. 15 (1897) Southeru
California Lumber Co. v. McDowell, 105 Cal. 99, 38 Pac. 627 (1894)
Yoakum v. Bower, 51 Cal. 539 (1876) Floyd v. Sellers, 7 Colo. App. 491, 44
Pae. 371 (1896) I-vrngsto& v. Arnoux, 56 N. Y. 507 (1874) Lorenzana v,.
Camarillo, 45 Cal. 125 (1872).
- Yoakum v. Bowers, Note 19.
2 1Livngston v. Arnoux, Note 19.
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Oregon was identical in terms to this present Washington statute.-2
In the former state, the foreclosure of mortgages and other liens
has been and is governed by statute, a former provision of which
declared a decree foreclosing a mortgage or other lien "shall have
the effect to bar the equity of redemption ' 23 of all parties de-
fendant in and to the land involved. In construing these former
provisions, the Supreme Court of Oregon has held2 1 that a decree
foreclosing a mortgage extinguishes all titles of all parties de-
fendant in and to the mortgaged land, designates some person
debtor, thereby bringing into existence the judgment debtor, who
as such had no previous existence, and upon whom the statute
confers the right of redemption. This right arises when a sale is
made pursuant to the decree, and the "successor in interest" of
the judgment debtor is one to whom that debtor conveys, assigns,
or transfers his right of redemption after it accrues, viz after the
execution sale. So the owner of the land at the time of that sale
is not entitled to redeem unless he is the judgment debtor, not-
withstanding that such owner acquired title from or through the
judgment debtor and is his successor in interest in the ordinary
acceptance of that term. In support of this view the court, in
the case under consideration, said
"The right of redemption is a creation of the statute,
and arises only after a sale upon a decree including a per
sonal judgment against a defendant. When this right
accrues, it may be transferred by the judgment debtor to
any one, and the latter then becomes a successor in inter
est. Evidently it is to such a person purchasing from
the judgment debtor after the sale that the redemption
section refers in speaking of the 'judgment debtor or his
successor in interest.' The foreclosure extinguished all
titles junior to the mortgage. None of the previous hold-
ers having such estates could redeem, as none of them is
in the category of redemptioners. That litigation stripped
the land of all claims subsequent to the mortgages and
offered the naked legal title for sale so as to create a
fund to which alone they could look for payment. The
22 Statute quoted in Higgs v. McDuffie. 51 Or. 265, 157 Pac. 794 (re-
hearing 158 Pac. 953). This decision was rendered in 1916. The following
year the legislature amended the statute to set aside the rule announced
in this decision. See Oregon Laws 1917, ch. 532, Olson's 1920 Oregon Code,
Sec. 245. This section of the Oregon Code differs, therefore, very radically
from the corresponding Washington law
" Statute is quoted in Higgs v. MeDuffie, Note 22. This quoted section,
like the other referred to in Note 22, was changed at the 1917 session of
the Oregon legislature, to set aside the rule announced in this case. The
provision that a decree shall foreclose all equity of redemption was elim-
inated. See Olson's 1920 Oregon Code, Sec. 427.
2,Higgs v. MeDuffie, Note 22.
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land was subject to redemption by the judgment debtor
who came into being at the rendition of the decree, and
not before. This individual, having no existence prior
to the decree with its feature of personal judgment, is the
only one entitled to redeem."
The Oregon court did not consider the effect of redemption by a
judgment debtor who has no title to the land.
To make this rule clear, suppose A, owner, mortgaged to B,
then conveyed to C, subject to the mortgage which C assumed and
agreed to pay, and C conveyed to D. B foreclosed his mortgage,
making A and D defendants, with judgment against A, and the
property was sold to X. After sale and during the statutory
period of redemption, X obtained a deed from D. Under the Ore-
gon rule A, being the judgment debtor, may redeem, but the de-
cree extingushed. the title of D, so he cannot redeem, and having
no title, his deed to X conveyed no interest whatever in the land.
As this decision involves the interpretation of a statute desig-
nating those who may redeem in terms similar to that of this state,
it would be profitable to discuss the divers and serious conse-
quences flowing from the decision if it be a sound precedent here.
Is it such a precedent2
It is not.
The decision is based upon the Oregon statutory declaration that
a decree foreclosing a mortgage or lien "shall have the effect to
bar the equity of redemption" of all defendants in the land in-
volved in the foreclosure, that is, to extinguish their titles and
estates. That such is the effect of a foreclosure decree in this
(Washington) state has been presented as an issue to the Supreme
Court and decided to the contrary,2 and the decision has been
consistently adhered to. Neither decree nor sale has that result.
As hereinbefore stated, title remains in the owner, and liens on
the property are merely suspended, during the redemption
period.26 Neither judgment, decree, or sale deprive the owner of
his legal title, but the sale operates to confer a right, that of
redemption. The statute expressly declares, "if the judgment
debtor redeem, the effect of the sale is terminated and he is re-
stored to his estate." -2 7  The same result follows redemption by
I' De Roberts v. Stiles, 24 Wash. 611, 64 Pac. 795 (1901). Appellant's
brief in this case presented the same theory adhered to in the Higgs v.




1 Sec. 597, Rem. Comp. Stat.
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the "successor in interest" of the judgment debtor.2 8 Redemption
by either merely terminates or sets the sale aside, leaving title to
the estate sold in the same condition it was before sale, except to
the extent a lien is discharged by the payment made to effect re-
demption." Consequently, where the owner and the judgment
debtor are not the same person, the debtor cannot, by conveyance of
the land, or assignment of his right to redeem, after the execution
sale, vest title to the property in some person not the owner. In
these cases, where the owner claims through the judgment debtor as
predecessor m ownership, either the owner, as successor in interest
of the debtor, or the debtor, or one to whom he may assign his
right,30 may redeem. But redemption by either of the latter two
merely inures to the benefit of the owner, 31 since the whole effect
of redemption is to set aside the sale. The owner does not thereby
get an "after-acquired" title, because he has title. To restrict
the term "successor in interest" of a judgment debtor to one to
whom the debtor may assign or transfer his right of redemption
after the sale, would, in all cases where the debtor is not the owner,
defeat the object and purpose of the statute.
There are instances where the owner does not have a legal right
of redemption. For example, A, owner, mortgages his land to B
to secure an indebtedness of C to B, for which A is not personally
liable. Upon foreclosure, the judgment debtor would be C, and
A would not be his successor in interest. However, there can be
no question that A would be held subrogated upon equitable prin-
ciple to C's right of redemption.
Where a mortgagor has conveyed his land to a grantee who as-
sumed and agreed to pay the mortgage, and where the mortgage
was subsequently foreclosed with personal judgment against the
mortgagor and sale made for less than the amount adjudged due,
from which sale the grantee redeemed, then upon payment of the
deficiency by the mortgagor, the latter is entitled to subrogation
to the rights of the mortgagee, and may effect a resale of the
property to enforce payment of the deficiency by the grantee.32
As redemption by the judgment debtor or his successor merely
terminates the sale, all liens upon the land suspended as a result
"De Roberts v. Stiles, Note 25, Ford v. Nokomis State Bank, Note 16.
- Cases in Note 28.
'0Schumacher v. Langford, 20 Cal. App. 61, 127 Pac. 1057 (1912) Big
Sespe Oil Co. v. Cochran, 276 Fed. 216 (C. C. A., 9th, 1921)
31 Lvngston v. Arnoux, Note 19" Bateman v. Kellogg, 59 Cal. App. 464,
211 Pac. 46 (1922).
12 Bollong v. Corman, 125 Wash. 441, 217 Pac. 27 (1923).
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of the sale are reinstated when either of those parties redeeems2.
The Supreme Court has not yet decided the effect of redemption
in a case like this. Suppose A, owner, mortgaged to B, then deeded
to C subject to the mortgage, which C did not assume and agree
to pay B foreclosed, making A and C defendants, got judgment
against A for the amount due and deficiency, and execution sale
was made for less than the amount of the judgment. The judg-
ment is not against C. He was not personally liable for the debt
or for the deficiency So far as he was concerned, the land alone
could be sold to pay the mortgage. If, in this case, C redeems,
would the deficiency judgment against A be reinstated, and the
land be subject to execution sale on account thereof 9 C, it must
be noted, did not acquire title from A after entry of the ejudgment,
but before, and if he redeems, he can only do so as successor in
interest of the judgment debtor, A. According to a decision of the
Supreme Court of Oregon, the deficiency against A, not having
been a lien on the premises when C acquired title, will not be a
lien on the land if C redeems, by the sale B exhausted his remedy
afforded by the mortgage.8 4 In support of this rule, the Supreme
Court of Oregon has said -3
"A mortgage is a specific lien, which attaches by vir
tue of the contract of the parties concerned, but the lien
of a judgment is general, and attaches by operation of
law, as a sequence of its rendition. Foreclosure is a
remedy by which the property covered by the mortgage
may be subjected to sale for the payment of the demand
for which the mortgage stands as security, and, when the
decree is had and the property sold to satisfy it, the mort-
gagee has obtained all he contracted for, but, if there is
also a personal decree against the mortgage debtor, this
Cases in Note 28. Decisions of the California courts on an issue of
this kind are not and cannot be precedents here in Washington, because of
the difference in the system between the two states in respect to decrees of
foreclosure. In California the docketing of a judgment of foreclosure does
not create a lien even for deficiency on the property of the debtor. Under
the rule there since 1860, the docketing of a deficiency only creates a lien.
The amount of the deficiency is ascertained after and as a result of the
sale, and no deficiency can be docketed until after the sheriff makes the
sale and ascertains as a result what deficiency, if any, there is, and makes
a return showing the deficiency. Then it may be docketed, and when
docketed is effective as a lien. 18 Cal. Jurisprudence, pages 496 et seq.,
Sees. 730 et seq. Here, as elsewhere stated in the article, a decree fore-
closing a mortrage is a general lien from the time of its entry. Under the
California rule the grantee, after sale, of the judgment debtor takes title
free from any lien for the deficiency, but if the judgment debtor redeem
it reattaches. Simpson v. Castle, 52 Cal. 644 (1878) Calkzns v. Stembach,
66 Cal. 117, 4 Pac. 1103 (1884).
31 Willis v. Miller, 23 Ore. 352, 31 Pac. 827 (1893).
" Case in Note 34.
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becomes, from the date of its docketing, a general lien
upon his real property, as in case of a judgment, and if
a deficiency remains after the application of the proceeds
of the sale of the lands covered by the mortgage, the de-
cree may be enforced by execution, as in other cases. The
resale does not take place under the order of the sale of
the specific property covered by the mortgage lien, for
that has been exhausted, but under the personal decree
which remains as a deficiency decree against the mortgage
debtor after the application of the proceeds arising under
the order of sale, and a redemption will not reinstate the
specific mortgage lien, while it will the general lien ac-
quired by the personal decree. This distinction is clear,
and is bottomed both upon principle and authority The
redemption is from the sale, and not from the mortgage,
and if the lien of the personal decree has never attached,
by reason of the mortgagor not having the fee of the
property at the time it was rendered, there never existed
any lien to be reinstated against his successor in interest,
who purchased prior to the decree."
It is true that here in Washington a mortgage foreclosure de-
cree operates as a general judgment lien on the debtor's property,
and a "deficiency judgment" is but a portion of the judgment
remaining unpaid after part payment either by the debtor or as
a result of an execution sale, and does not have to be docketed as
a separate judgment to be operative as a lien.3 6  But in the sup-
posed case, the judgment debtor did not own the land at the time
of entry of the judgment, and so the judgment could not operate
as a lien thereon. The land was sold because of the lien of the
mortgage foreclosed by the decree, and discharged by the sale,
leaving a deficiency on the judgment, which was not a lien on
the premises. There being no relationship of principal and surety
between A and C as to liability for the mortgage, and no personal
obligation therefor on the part of C to B, there is no occasion
for preservation of the mortgage lien to accomplish equities be-
tween the parties. If C purchased from A after the sale and re-
deemed, the deficiency, not the mortgage lien, would attach. So,
in the supposed case, it seems plain that if C redeem, the mortgage
lien could not reattach, because discharged, and the deficiency
could not, because it never had been and could not be a lien.
Since a deficiency judgment cannot be rendered against a non-
resident served with process by publication and who does not
2 CoddL V. Von Der Ahe, 92 Wash. 529, 159 Pac. 686 (1916) Fuller &
Co. v. Hull, 19 Wash. 400, 53 Pac. 666 (1898) Shumway v. Orchard, 12
Wash. 104, 40 Pac. 634 (1895) Hays v. Miller 1 W T. 143 (1861)
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appear in the action or suit, the deficiency is not reinstated as a
lien on the land when redeemed by the judgment debtor."
Other than the judgment debtor or his successor, the only per-
sons granted the right to redeem are those who have "a lien by
judgment, decree, or mortgage on any portion of the property, or
any portion of any part thereof separately sold, subsequent in
time to that on which the property was sold." 38  These creditors
are termed redemptioners. The statute is clear and unambiguous.
To redeem a creditor must have a lien by judgment, decree or
mortgage. So the holder of a lien by attachment, or of a laborer's,
mechamc's, materialman's, or contractor's lien has no right to
redeem by virtue thereof. Of course, when any such lien has been
reduced to judgment, fhe holder then has a lien by judgment with
the same rights any other judgment creditor has." Furthermore, in
order to redeem, the creditor must have a lien by judgment, de-
cree, or mortgage "subsequent in time to that on which the property
was sold." The word "that" in this quoted phrase refers to the
lien the sale was made to satisfy 4 0 Thus, where property is sub-
ject to a mortgage and junior lien, and the mortgage is foreclosed
and sale made, the mortgage lien (and not the lien of the decree
of foreclosure), is "that on which the property was sold," so that
the jumor lien is "subsequent in time" thereto, (though prior to
the lien of the foreclosure decree,) and its holder may redeem.
Since a creditor must have a lien "subsequent in time to that
on which the property was sold" to be entitled to, redeem, it fol-
lows that a creditor may not redeem from his own sale, a sale made
to satisfy his own lien. That the sale results in a deficiency does
not change this rule, as the deficiency is not a lien subsequent to
that which the sale was made to satisfy So where a plaintiff by
his complaint, and defendants or intervenors by cross-complaints,
in one suit, seek foreclosure and execution sale in satisfaction of
their mortgages or liens,.and obtain a decree adjudging the amount
due each, fixing the order of priority, ordering the property sold
and distribution of proceeds among the parties in the order of
their rank, the sale is for and on behalf of each and all, and no
one or class of these parties has any right of redemption, even
37Herron v. Allen, 32 S. D. 301, 143 N. W 283 (1913) Howard V. Me-
Naught, 9 Wash. 355, 37 Pac. 455, 43 A. S. R. 837 (1894).
ISec. 594, Rem. Comp. Stat.
Paddack v. Staley, 13 Colo. App. 363, 58 Pac. 363 (1899)
"4Elzrudge v. Wright, 55 Cal. 531 (1880) Hervey v. Krost, Note 8;
Western Land & Cattle Go. v. National Bank of Arizona, Note 41.
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though the proceeds of the sale be insufficient to pay the full
amount due some. 41 As said of a case of this character -2
"There was one decree, and it was the decree of all the
lienholders. The decree authorized one sale, and it was
the sale of all the judgment creditors. If the property
had sold for enough to satisfy the judgment of appellee
(a lienholder given judgment in the cause,) in whole or in
part, it could not be doubted that the sale was on its own
judgment, and the fact that it did not sell for enough to
satisfy its judgment does not change the principle which
governs the case. The decree directed the property to be
sold to pay all the liens, and made provision for distribu-
tion to the appellee and all other lien holders, so that
there could only be one sale. *
"As the law contemplates a final decree adjusting all
rights and equities, and as such a decree was rendered in
the foreclosure suit involved in this case, it necessarily re-
sults that a sale upon that decree was a sale on all the
judgments embodied in it. This being true, it must also
be true that none of the claimants in whose favor a
judgment was incorporated in the decree of the court can
redeem from the sale made by the decree."
The code provisions " governing liens of laborers, mechanics,
and materialmen especially provides that such liens may be fore-
closed and enforced in a civil action, that all persons who, prior
to the commencement of such action, shall have filed liens against
the same property shall be joined as parties, and no person shall
begin an action to foreclose his lien while a prior action is pending,
to which he may apply to be made a party and in which his lien
may be foreclosed. Furthermore, in every case in which different
or various liens are claimed on the same property, the court must
fix the rank thereof in the order specified in the statute, and the
proceeds of the sale must be applied to each lien or class of liens in
the order of its rank, and
"personal judgment may be rendered in an action
brought to foreclose a lien against any party personally
liable for any debt for which the lien is claimed, and if
the lien be established, the judgment shall provide for
the enforcement thereof upon the property liable as in
case of foreclosure of mortgages, and the amount realized
"Western Land & Cattle Co. v. National Bank of Arzzona, 28 Ariz. 270,
236 Pac. 725 (1925) McCullough v. Rose, 4 Ill. App. 149 (1879) Horn v.
Indianapolis National Bank, 125 Ind. 381, 25 N. E. 558, 21 A. S. R. 231, 9
L. R. A. 676 (1890) Laurtat v. Stratton, 11 Fed. 107 (0. C., D. Ore.,
(1880) Hayden v. Smith, 58 Ia. 285, 12 N. W 289 (1882) Clayton v.
Ellis, 50 Ia. 590 (1879).
"Horn v. Indianapolis Nat. Bank, Note 41.41Rem. Comp. Stat. (Wash., 1922), § 1129 et seq.
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by such enforcement of the lien shall be credited upon the
proper personal judgment and the deficiency, if any re-
oaining unsatisfied shall stand as a personal judgment,
and may be collected by execution against the party liable
therefor."
These statutes clearly reqmre that where there are two or more
liens on one tract or lot, they must be foreclosed in one suit. The
sale in such cases is necessarily for and on behalf of each and all,
so none has any right to redeem, even though not paid by reason
of the insufficiency of the proceeds of the sale. As heretofore
stated, these lien clannants have no right of redemption by virtue
of their lien,-not being creditors having a lien by judgment,
decree, or mortgage,--and consequently a lien claimant cannot
elect to preserve a right of redemption as mortgagees and judg-
ment creditors may do in foreclosures as related in the succeeding
paragraphs.
Since a creditor may redeem who has a lien by judgment, de-
cree, or mortgage subsequent in time to that on which the sale was
made, a junior mortgagee or judgment lien claimant, who is de-
fendant in a suit to foreclose a senior mortgage, may elect, in sun-
ple cases at least, to obtain foreclosure of his own lien and thereby
lose Ins right of redemption, or to waive foreclosure and preserve
his redemption right. For example, A, owner, mortgages to B,
and then to C. B institutes suit to foreclose his mortgage, making
A and C defendants, and alleges in the usual form that C has or
claims to have some right, etc., in the land,which, if any he has,
is junior, subordinate, etc. to plaintiff's mortgage, and praying
that it be so adjudged. In this supposed case C can pursue one
of several courses.
1. C can default. Judgment will be in favor of B, with re-
sultant sale for satisfaction of B's mortgage only The mortgage
lien of C being "subsequent in time to that on which the property
was sold" enables him to redeem. This is so although the decree
fix the amount due C and directs any surplus remaining after
payment of B be applied on C's mortgage.44
2. C may appear and answer, asking application of any surplus
after payment of B, be applied on his, C's, mortgage. In this case
C may redeem. 4'
3. C may appear and answer, admitting B's allegations, or deny
"Frnk v. Murphy, 21 Cal. 108 (1862) and comment on this case in
Black v. Gerchten, 58 Cal. 56 (1881) Ft. Wayne Builders S. Co. v. Pfeif-
fer, Note 10; Laursat v. Stratton, Note 41.
5 Camp v. Land, 122 Cal. 167, 54 Pac. 839 (1898)
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the same and pray dismissal. From the sale on B's behalf, C may
redeem.46
4. C may answer and cross-complain praying foreclosure of
his mortgage. The decree in favor of B and C foreclosing their
mortgages and ensuant sale, is for and on behalf of both B and
C, and C cannot redeem. This is so although the sale does not
produce enough to pay the amounts due B and C.47
As said in one case .48
"A mortgagee cannot redeem from a sale made upon
his mortgage, and it makes no difference whether the
foreclosure was in a suit originally brought by him or
upon a cross-complaint in which he prays for and obtains
a foreclosure in a suit brought by another. And it makes
no difference whether the junior mortgagee does or does
not have a deficiency judgment entered in his favor."
F C. HACKMAN.'
"6 This deducible from rules 1 and 2, and cases cited in Notes 44 and 45.
47 Camp v. Land, Note 45 San Jose Water Co. v. Lyndon, 124 Cal. 518,
57 Pac. 481 (1899) Black v. Gerchten, Note 44, and cases in Note 41,
Hershey v. Dennis, 53 Cal. 77 (1878).
"Black v. Geriehten, Note 44.
*Of the Seattle bar.
